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Abstract
When data analysts operate within different statistical frameworks (e.g., frequentist ver-
sus Bayesian, emphasis on estimation versus emphasis on testing), how does this impact
the qualitative conclusions that are drawn for real data? To study this question empirically
we selected from the literature two simple scenarios –involving a comparison of two propor-
tions and a Pearson correlation– and asked four teams of statisticians to provide a concise
analysis and a qualitative interpretation of the outcome. The results showed considerable
overall agreement; nevertheless, this agreement did not appear to diminish the intensity of
the subsequent debate over which statistical framework is more appropriate to address the
questions at hand.
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1 Introduction
When analyzing a specific data set, statisticians usually operate within the confines of their
preferred inferential paradigm. For instance, frequentist statisticians interested in hypothesis
testing may report p-values, whereas those interested in estimation may seek to draw conclusions
from confidence intervals. In the Bayesian realm, those who wish to test hypotheses may use
Bayes factors and those who wish to estimate parameters may report credible intervals. And
then there are likelihoodists, information-theorists, and machine-learners — there exists a diverse
collection of statistical approaches, many of which are philosophically incompatible.
Moreover, proponents of the various camps regularly explain why their position is the most
exalted, either in practical or theoretical terms. For instance, in a well-known article ‘Why Isn’t
Everyone a Bayesian?’, Bradley Efron claimed that “The high ground of scientific objectivity
has been seized by the frequentists” (Efron, 1986, p. 4), upon which Dennis Lindley replied that
“Every statistician would be a Bayesian if he took the trouble to read the literature thoroughly
and was honest enough to admit that he might have been wrong.” (Lindley, 1986, p. 7).
Similarly spirited debates occurred earlier, notably between Fisher and Jeffreys (e.g., Howie,
2002) and between Fisher and Neyman. Even today, the paradigmatic debates show no sign of
stalling, neither in the published literature (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2018; McShane et al., ress;
Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016) nor on social media.
The question that concerns us here is purely pragmatic: ‘does it matter?’ In other words, will
reasonable statistical analyses on the same data set, each conducted within their own paradigm,
result in qualitatively similar conclusions (Berger, 2003)? One of the first to pose this question
was Ronald Fisher. In a letter to Harold Jeffreys, dated March 29, 1934, Fisher proposed that
“From the point of view of interesting the general scientific public, which really ought to be
much more interested than it is in the problem of inductive inference, probably the most useful
thing we could do would be to take one or more specific puzzles and show what our respective
methods made of them” (Bennett, 1990, p. 156; see also Howie, 2002, p. 167). The two men then
proceeded to construct somewhat idiosyncratic statistical ‘puzzles’ that the other found difficult
to solve. Nevertheless, three years and several letters later, on May 18, 1937, Jeffreys stated that
“Your letter confirms my previous impression that it would only be once in a blue moon that we
would disagree about the inference to be drawn in any particular case, and that in the exceptional
cases we would both be a bit doubtful” (Bennett, 1990, p. 162). Similarly, Edwards et al. (1963)
suggested that well-conducted experiments often satisfy Berkson’s interocular traumatic test –
“you know what the data mean when the conclusion hits you between the eyes” (p. 217).
Nevertheless, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which, in concrete scenarios, a data
analyst’s statistical plumage affects the inference.
Here we revisit Fisher’s challenge. We invited four groups of statisticians to analyze two
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real data sets, report and interpret their results in about 300 words, and discuss these results
and interpretations in a round-table discussion. The data sets are provided online at https:
//osf.io/hykmz/ and described below. In addition to providing an empirical answer to the
question ‘does it matter?’, we hope to highlight how the same data set can give rise to rather
different statistical treatments. In our opinion, this method variability ought to be acknowledged
rather than ignored (for a complementary approach see Silberzahn et al., ress).1
The selected data sets are straightforward: the first data set concerns a 2x2 contingency
table, and the second concerns a correlation between two variables. The simplicity of the sta-
tistical scenarios is on purpose, as we hoped to facilitate a detailed discussion about assump-
tions and conclusions that could otherwise have remained hidden underneath an unavoidable
layer of statistical sophistication. The full instructions for participation can be found online at
https://osf.io/dg9t7/.
2 Data Set I: Birth Defects and Cetirizine Exposure
2.1 Study summary
Cetirizine is a non-sedating long-acting antihistamine with some mast-cell stabilizing activity. It
is used for the symptomatic relief of allergic conditions, such as rhinitis and urticaria, which are
common in pregnant women. In the study of interest, Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer (2008)
aimed to assess the safety of cetirizine during the first trimester of pregnancy when used. The
pregnancy outcomes of a cetirizine group (n = 181) were compared to those of the control group
(n = 1685; pregnant women who had been counseled during pregnancy about exposures known to
be non-teratogenic). Due to the observational nature of the data, the allocation of participants
to the groups was non-randomized. The main point of interest was the rate of birth defects.2
Variables of the data set3 are described in Table 1 and the data are presented in Table 2.
2.2 Cetirizine research question
Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a higher incidence of birth defects? In
the next sections each of four data analysis teams will attempt to address this question.
1In contrast to the current approach, Silberzahn et al. (ress) used a relatively complex data set and did
notemphasize the differences in interpretation caused by the adoption of dissimilar statistical paradigms.
2The original study focused on Cetirizine-induced differences in major birth defects, spontaneous abortions,
and preterm deliveries. We decided to look at all birth defects, because the sample sizes were larger for this
comparison and we deemed the data more interesting.
3The data set is made available on the OSF repository: https://osf.io/hykmz/.
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Table 1: Variable names and their description.
Variable Description
CetirizineExposure Whether exposed to cetirizine
BirthDefect Whether birth defects were detected
Counts Count data for each cell
Table 2: Cetirizine exposure and birth defects.
Birth Defects
Cetirizine Exposure No Yes Total
No 1588 97 1685
Yes 167 14 181
Total 1755 111 1866
2.3 Analysis and interpretation by Lakens and Hennig
2.3.1 Preamble
Frequentist statistics is based on idealised models of data generating processes. We cannot ex-
pect these models to be literally true in practice, but it is instructive to see whether data are
consistent with such models, which is what hypothesis tests and confidence intervals allow us to
examine. We do appreciate that automatic procedures involving for example fixed significance
levels allow us to control error probabilities assuming the model, but given that the models do
never hold precisely, and that there are often issues with measurement or selection effects, in
most cases we think it is prudent to interpret outcomes in a coarse way rather than to read
too much meaning into, say, differences between p-values of 0.047 and 0.062. We stick to quite
elementary methodology in our analyses.
2.3.2 Analysis and software
We performed a Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity correction to test for depen-
dence between exposure of pregnant women exposed to cetirizine and birth defects using the
chisq.test function in R software version 3.4.3 (R Development Core Team, 2004). However,
because Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer (2008) wanted “to assess the safety of cetirizine dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy”, their actual research question is whether we can reject
the presence of a meaningful effect. We therefore performed an equivalence test on proportions
(Chen et al., 2000) as implemented in the TOSTtwo.prop function in the TOSTER package
(Lakens, 2017).
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2.3.3 Results and interpretation
The chi-squared test yielded χ2(1, N = 1866) = 0.817, p = .366, which suggests that the data
are consistent with an independence model at any significance level in general use. The answer
to the question whether the drug is safe depends on a smallest effect size of interest (when is
the difference in birth defects considered too small to matter?). This choice, and the selection
of equivalence bounds more generally, should always be justified by clinical and statistical con-
siderations pertinent to the case at hand. In the absence of a discussion of this essential aspect
of the study by the authors, and in order to show an example computation, we will test against
a difference in proportions of 10%, which, although debatable, has been suggested as a sensible
bound for some drugs (see Ro¨hmel, 2001, for a discussion).
An equivalence test against a difference in proportions (Mdif = 0.02, 95% CI[−0.02; 0.06]) of
10% based on Fishers exact z-test was significant, z = −3.88, p < 0.001. This means that we can
reject differences in proportions as large, or larger, than 10%, again at any significance level in
general use.
Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a higher incidence of birth defects?
Based on the current study, there is no evidence that cetirizine exposure during pregnancy is
associated with a higher incidence of birth defects. Obviously this does not mean that cetirizine
is safe; in fact the observed birth defect rate in the cetirizine group is about 2% higher than
without exposure, which may or may not be explained by random variation. Is cetirizine during
the first trimester of pregnancy ‘safe’? If we accept a difference in the proportion of birth defects
of 10%, and desire a 5% long run error rate, there is clear evidence that the drug is safe. However,
we expect that a cost-benefit analysis would suggest proportions of 5% to be unacceptably high,
which is in the 95% confidence interval and therefore well compatible with the data. Therefore,
we would personally consider the current data inconclusive.
2.4 Analysis and interpretation by Morey and Homer
Fitting a classical logistic model with the binary birth defect outcome predicted from the ceti-
rizine indicator confirmed the non-significant relationship (p = 0.287). The point estimate of the
effect of taking cetirizine is to increase the odds of the birth defect by only 37%. At the base-
line levels of birth defects in the non-cetirizine-exposed sample (approximately 6%), this would
amount to about an extra two birth defects in every hundred pregnancies in the cetirizine-exposed
group.
There are several problems with taking these data as evidence that cetirizine is safe. The
first is the observational nature of the data. We have no way of knowing whether an apparent
effect — or lack of effect — reflects confounds. Suppose, though, that we set this question aside
and assess the evidence that birth defects are not more common in the cetirizine group. We can
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use a classical one-sided CI to determine the size of the differences we can rule out. We call the
upper bound of the 100(1 − α)% CI the “worst case” for that confidence coefficient. Figure 1
shows that at 95%, the worst case odds increase is for the cetirizine group is 124%. At 99.5%, the
worst case increase is 195%. We can translate this into more a more intuitive metric of numbers
of birth defects: at baseline rates of birth defects, these would amount to additional 6 and 10
birth defects per 100, respectively (Figure 2).
The large p-value of the initial significance test suggests we cannot rule out that cetirizine
group has lower rates of birth defects; the one-sided test assuming a decrease in birth defects as
the null would not yield a rejection except at high α levels. But also, the “worst case” analysis
using the upper bound of the one-sided CI suggests we also cannot rule out a substantial increase
in birth defects in the cetirizine group.
We are unsure whether cetirizine is safe, but it seems clear to us that these data do not
provide much evidence of its relative safety, contrary to what Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer
suggest.
Figure 1: Estimates of the odds of a birth defect when no cetirizine (control) was taken during
pregnancy and when cetirizine was taken. Horizontal dashed lines and shaded regions show point
estimates and standard errors. The solid line labeled “Cetirizine worst case” shows the upper
bound of the one-sided CI as a function of the confidence coefficient (x-axis). The right axis
shows the estimated increase in odds of a birth defect for the cetirizine group compared to the
control group.
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Figure 2: Frequency representations of the number of birth defects expected under various
scenarios. Top: Expected frequency of birth defects when cetirizine was not taken (control).
Bottom-left: Point estimate of the expected frequency of birth defects when cetirizine is taken.
Bottom-middle (bottom-right): Upper bound of a one-sided 95% (99%) CI for the expected
frequency of birth defects when cetirizine was taken. Because the analysis is intended to be
comparative, in the bottom panels the no-cetirizine estimate was assumed to be the truth when
calculating the increase in frequency.
2.5 Analysis and interpretation by Gronau, van Doorn, and Wagen-
makers
We used the model proposed by Kass and Vaidyanathan (1992):
log ( p1
1 − p1 ) = β − ψ2
log ( p2
1 − p2 ) = β + ψ2
y1 ∼ Binomial(n1, p1)
y2 ∼ Binomial(n2, p2).
(1)
Here, y1 = 97, n1 = 1,685, y2 = 14, and n2 = 181, p1 is the probability of a birth defect in
the control group, and p2 is that probability in the cetirizine group. Probabilities p1 and p2
are functions of model parameters β and ψ. Nuisance parameter β corresponds to the grand
mean of the log odds, whereas the test-relevant parameter ψ corresponds to the log odds ratio.
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We assigned β a standard normal prior and used a zero-centered normal prior with standard
deviation σ for the log odds ratio ψ. Inference was conducted with Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017;
Stan Development Team, 2016) and the bridgesampling package (Gronau et al., 2017). For
ease of interpretation, the results will be shown on the odds ratio scale.
Our first analysis focuses on estimation and uses σ = 1. The result, shown in the left panel of
Figure 3, indicates that the posterior median equals 1.429, with a 95% credible interval ranging
from 0.793 to 2.412. This credible interval is relatively wide, indicating substantial uncertainty
about the true value of the odds ratio.
Our second analysis focuses on testing and quantifies the extent to which the data support the
skeptic’sH0 ∶ ψ = 0 versus the proponent’sH1. To specifyH1 we initially use σ = 0.4 (i.e., a mildly
informative prior; Diamond and Kaul, 2004), truncated at zero to respect the fact that cetirizine
exposure is hypothesized to cause a higher incidence of birth defects: H+ ∶ ψ ∼ N+(0,0.42).
As can be seen from the right panel of Figure 3, the observed data are predicted about 1.8
times better by H+ than by H0. According to Jeffreys (1961, Appendix B), this level of support
is “not worth more than a bare mention”. To investigate the robustness of this result we explored
a range of alternative prior choices for σ under H+, varying it from 0.01 to 2. The results of this
sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 4 and reveal that across a wide range of priors, the data
never provide more than anecdotal support for one model over the other. When σ is selected
post-hoc to maximize the support for H+ this yields BF+0 = 1.84, which, starting from a position
of equipoise, raises the probability of H+ from 0.50 to about 0.65, leaving a posterior probability
of 0.35 for H0.
In sum, based on this data set we cannot draw strong conclusions about whether or not
cetirizine exposure during pregnancy is associated with a higher incidence of birth defects. Our
analysis shows an ‘absence of evidence’, not ‘evidence for absence’.
2.6 Analysis and interpretation by Gelman
I summarized the data with a simple comparison: the proportion of birth defects is 0.06 in the
control group and 0.08 in the cetirizine group. The difference is 0.02 with a standard error of
0.02. I got essentially the same result with a logistic regression predicting birth defect: the
coefficient of cetirizine is 0.3 with a standard error of 0.3. I performed the analyses in R using
rstanarm (code available at https://osf.io/nh4gc/).
I then looked up the article, “The safety of cetirizine during pregnancy: A prospective obser-
vational cohort study”, by Weber-Schoendorfer and Schaefer (2008) and noticed some interesting
things:
(a) The published article gives N = 196 and 1686 for the two groups, not quite the same as the
181 and 1685 for the “all birth defects” category. I couldn’t follow the exact reasoning.4
4Clarification: the original paper does not provide a rationale for why several participants were excluded from
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(b) Testing results.
Figure 3: Gronau, van Doorn, and Wagenmakers’ Bayesian analysis of the cetirizine data set. The
left panel shows the results of estimating the log odds ratio under H1 with a two-sided standard
normal prior. For ease of interpretation, results are displayed on the odds ratio scale. The
right panel shows the results of testing the one-sided alternative hypothesis H+ ∶ ψ ∼ N +(0,0.42)
versus the null hypothesis H0 ∶ ψ = 0. Figures inspired by JASP (jasp-stats.org).
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis for the Bayesian one-sided test. The Bayes factor BF+0 is a function
of the prior standard deviation σ. Figure inspired by JASP.
(b) The two groups differ in various background variables: most notably, the cetirizine group
has a higher smoking rate (17% compared to 10%).
(c) In the published article, the outcome of focus was “major birth defects”, not the “all birth
defects” given for us to study.
the analysis.
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(d) The published article has a causal aim (as can be seen, for example, from the word “safety”
in its title); our assignment is purely observational.
Now the question, “Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a higher incidence
of birth defects?” I have not read the literature on the topic. To understand how the data at hand
address this question, I would like to think of the mapping from prior to posterior distribution.
In this case, the prior would be the distribution of association with birth defects of all drugs of
this sort. That is, imagine a population of drugs, j = 1,2, . . . , taken by pregnant women, and for
each drug, define θj as the proportion of birth defects among women who took drug j, minus the
proportion of birth defects in the general population. Just based on my general understanding
(which could be wrong), I would expect this distribution to be more positive than negative and
concentrated near zero: some drugs could be mildly protective against birth defects or associated
with low-risk pregnancies, most would have small effects and not be strongly associated with low
or high-risk pregnancies, and some could cause birth defects or be taken disproportionately by
women with high-risk pregnancies. Supposing that the prior is concentrated within the range
(−0.01, +0.01), the data would not add much information to this prior.
To answer, “Is cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a higher incidence of
birth defects?”, the key question would seem to be whether the drug is more or less likely to be
taken by women at higher risk of birth defects. I’m guessing that maternal age is a big predictor
here. In the reported study, average age of the exposed and control groups was the same, but I
don’t know if that’s generally the case or if the designers of the study were purposely seeking a
balanced comparison.
3 Data Set II: Amygdalar Activity and Perceived Stress
3.1 Study summary
In a recent study published in the Lancet, Tawakol et al. (2017) tested the hypothesis that
perceived stress is positively associated with resting activity in the amygdala. In the second study
reported in Tawakol et al. (2017), n = 13 individuals with an increased burden of chronic stress
(i.e., a history of post-traumatic stress disorder or PTSD) were recruited from the community,
completed a Perceived Stress Scale (i.e., the PSS-10; Cohen et al., 1983) and had their amygdalar
activity measured. Variables of the data set5 are described in Table 3, the raw data are presented
in Table 4, and the data are visualized in Figure 5.
5The data set is made available on the OSF repository: https://osf.io/hykmz/.
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3.2 Amygdala research question
Do PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity experience more stress? In the
next sections each of four data analysis teams will attempt to address this question.
Table 3: Variable names and their description.
Variable Description
Perceived stress scale Participant score on the PSS
Amygdalar activity Intensity of amygdalar resting state activity
Table 4: Raw data as extracted from Figure 5 in Tawakol et al. (2017), with help of Jurgen
Rusch, Philips Research Eindhoven.
Perceived Amygdalar
Stress Scale Activity
12.0103 5.2418
32.0350 6.8601
22.0296 6.4402
20.0079 5.4620
24.0155 5.4439
24.0155 5.3349
24.0155 5.4216
26.0082 5.5176
28.0120 5.1615
21.9872 4.7114
21.9872 4.1844
20.0138 4.3079
16.0088 3.3015
3.3 Analysis and interpretation by Lakens and Hennig
3.3.1 Analysis and software
We calculated tests for uncorrelatedness based on both Pearson’s product-moment correlation
and Spearman’s rank correlation using the cor.test function in the stats package in R 3.4.3.
3.3.2 Results and interpretation
The Pearson correlation between perceived stress and resting activity in the amygdala is r =
0.555, and the corresponding test yields p = 0.047. Although this is just smaller than the
conventional 5% level, we do not consider it as clear evidence for nonzero correlation. From the
appendix it becomes clear that the reported correlations are exploratory: “Patients completed a
battery of self-report measures that assessed variables that may correlate with PTSD symptom
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of amygdalar activity and perceived stress in 13 patients with PTSD. Data
extracted from Figure 5 in Tawakol et al. (2017), with help of Jurgen Rusch, Philips Research
Eindhoven.
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severity, including comorbid depressive and anxiety symptoms (MADRS, HAMA) and a well-
validated questionnaire Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-10).” Therefore, corrections for multiple
comparisons would be required to maintain a given significance level. The article does not
provide us with sufficient information to determine the number of tests that were performed,
but corrections for multiple comparisons would thus be in order. Consequently, the fairly large
observed correlation and the borderline significant p-value can be interpreted as an indication
that it may be worthwhile to investigate the issue with a larger sample size, but do not give
conclusive evidence. Visual inspection of the data does not give any indication against the
validity of using Pearson’s correlation, but with N = 13 we do not have very strong information
regarding the distributional shape. The analogous test based on Spearman’s correlation yields
p = 0.062, which given its weaker power is compatible with the qualitative interpretation we gave
based on the Pearson correlation.
Do PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity experience more stress? Based
on the current study, we can not conclude that PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar
activity experience more stress. The single p = 0.047 is not low enough to indicate clear evidence
against the null hypothesis after correcting for multiple comparisons when using an alpha of .05.
Therefore, our conclusion is: Based on the desired error rate specified by the authors, we can’t
reject a correlation of zero between amygdalar activity and participants’ score on the perceived
stress scale. With a 95% CI that ranges from r = 0 to r = 0.85, it seems clear that effects that
would be considered interesting cannot be rejected in an equivalence test. Thus, the results are
inconclusive.
3.4 Analysis and interpretation by Morey and Homer
The first thing that should be noted about this data set is that it contains a meager 13 data
points. The linear correlation by Tawakol et al. (2017) depends on assumptions that are for
all intents and purposes unverifiable with this few participants. Add to this the difficulty of
interpreting the independent variable — a sum of ordinal responses — and we are justified being
skeptical of any hard conclusions from these data.
Suppose, however, that the relationship between these two variables was best characterized by
a linear correlation, and set aside any worries about assumptions. The large observed correlation
coupled with the marginal p value should signal to us that a wide range of correlations are not
ruled out by the data. Consider that the 95% CI on the Pearson correlation is [0.009,0.848]; the
99.5% CI is [−0.254,0.908]. Negligible correlations are not ruled out; due to the small sample
size, any correlation from “essentially zero” to “the correlation between height and leg length”
(that is, very high) is consistent with these data. The solid curve in Figure 6 shows the lower
bound of the confidence interval on the linear correlation for a wide range of confidence levels;
they are all negligible or even negative.
13
Figure 6: Confidence intervals and one-sided tests for the Pearson correlation as a function of the
confidence coefficient. The vertical lines represent the confidence intervals (confidence coefficient
on lower axis), and the curve represents the value that is just rejected by the one-sided test (α
on the upper axis).
Finally, the authors did not show that this correlation is selective to the amygdala; it seems
to us that interpreting the correlation as evidence for their model requires selectivity. It is
important to interpret the correlation in the context of the relationship between amygdala resting
state activity, stress, and cardiovascular disease. If one could not show that amygdala resting-
state activation showed a substantially higher correlation with stress than other brain regions
not implicated in the model, this would suggest that the correlation cannot be used to bolster
their case. Given the uncertainty in the estimate of the correlation, there is little chance of being
able to show this.
All in all, we’re not sure that the information in these thirteen participants is enough to say
anything beyond “the correlation doesn’t appear to be (very) negative.”
3.5 Analysis and interpretation by van Doorn, Gronau, and Wagen-
makers
We applied Harold Jeffreys’s test for a Pearson correlation coefficient ρ (Jeffreys, 1961; Ly et al.,
2018) as implemented in JASP (jasp-stats.org; JASP Team, 2018).6 Our first analysis focuses
on estimation and assigns ρ a uniform prior from −1 to 1. The result, shown in the left panel of
Figure 7, indicates that the posterior median equals 0.47, with a 95% credible interval ranging
from −0.01 to 0.81. As can be expected with only 13 observations, there is great uncertainty
about the size of ρ.
Our second analysis focuses on testing and quantifies the extent to which the data support
6JASP is an open-source statistical software program with a graphical user interface that supports both
frequentist and Bayesian analyses.
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the skeptic’s H0 ∶ ρ = 0 versus the proponent’s H1. To specify H1 we initially use Jeffreys’s
default uniform distribution, truncated at zero to respect the directionality of the hypothesized
effect: H+ ∶ ρ ∼ U[0,1].
As can be seen from the right panel of Figure 7, the observed data are predicted about 3.9
times better by H+ than by H0. This degree of support is relatively modest: when H+ and H0
are equally likely a priori, the Bayes factor of 3.9 raises the posterior plausibility of H+ from 0.50
to 0.80, leaving a non-negligible 0.20 for H0.
To investigate the robustness of this result we explored a continuous range of alternative
prior distributions for ρ under H+; specifically, we assigned ρ a stretched Beta(a,a) distribution
truncated at zero, and studied how the Bayes factor changes with 1/a, the parameter that
quantifies the prior width and governs the extent to which H+ predicts large values of r. The
results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 8 and confirm that the data provide
modest support for H+ across a wide range of priors. When the precision is selected post-hoc
to maximize the support for H+ this yields BF+0 = 4.35, which –under a position of equipose–
raises the plausibility of H+ from 0.50 to about 0.81, leaving a posterior probability of 0.19 forH0.
A similar sensitivity analysis could be conducted for H0 by assuming a ‘perinull’ (Tukey,
1995, p. 8) - a distribution tightly centered around ρ = 0 rather than a point mass on ρ = 0. The
results will be qualitatively similar.
In sum, the claim that ‘PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity experience
more stress receives modest but not compelling support from the data. The 13 observations do
not warrant categorical statements, neither about the presence nor about the strength of the
hypothesized effect.
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(a) Estimation results
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(b) Testing results
Figure 7: van Doorn, Gronau, and Wagenmakers’ Bayesian analysis of the amygdala data set.
The left panel shows the result of estimating the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ under H1 with
a two-sided uniform prior. The right panel shows the result of testing H0 ∶ ρ = 0 versus the
one-sided alternative hypothesis H+ ∶ ρ ∼ U[0,1]. Figures from JASP.
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis for the Bayesian one-sided correlation test. The Bayes factor BF+0
is a function of the prior width parameter 1/a from the stretched Beta(a,a) distribution. Figure
from JASP.
3.6 Analysis and interpretation by Gelman
I summarized the data with a simple scatterplot and a linear regression of logarithm of perceived
stress on logarithm of amygdalar activity, using log scales because the data were all-positive and
it seemed reasonable to model a multiplicative relation. The scatterplot revealed a positive
correlation and no other striking patterns, and the regression coefficient was estimated at 0.6
with a standard error of 0.4. I performed the analyses in R using rstanarm (code available at
https://osf.io/nh4gc/). and the standard error is based on the median absolute deviation of
posterior simulations (see help(“mad”) in R for more on this).
I then looked up the article, “Relation between resting amygdalar activity and cardiovascular
events: a longitudinal and cohort study”, by Tawakol et al. (2017). The goal of the research
is “to determine whether [the amygdala’s] resting metabolic activity predicts risk of subsequent
cardiovascular events.” Here are some items relevant to our current task:
(a) Perceived stress is an intermediate outcome, not the ultimate goal of the study.
(b) Any correlation or predictive relation will depend on the reference population. The people
in this particular study are “individuals with a history of post-traumatic stress disorder”
living in the Boston area.
(c) The published article reports that “Perceived stress was associated with amygdalar activity
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(r = 0.56; p = 0.0485).” Performing the correlation (or, equivalently, the regression) on the
log scale, the result is not statistically significant at the 5% level. This is no big deal given
that I don’t think that it makes sense to make decisions based on a statistical significance
threshold, but it is relevant when considering scientific communication.
(d) Comparing my log-scale scatterplot to the raw-scale scatterplot (Figure 5A in the pub-
lished article), I’d say that the unlogged scatterplot looks cleaner, with the points more
symmetrically distributed. Indeed, based on these data alone, I’d move to an unlogged
analysis–that is, the estimated correlation of 0.56 reported in the paper.
To address the question, “Do PTSD patients with high resting state amygdalar activity
experience more stress?”, we need two additional decisions or pieces of information. First, we
must decide the population of interest; here there is a challenge in extrapolating from people
with PTSD to the general population. Second, we need a prior distribution for the correlation
being estimated. It is difficult for me to address either of these issues: as a statistician my
contribution would be to map from assumptions to conclusions. In this case, the assumptions
about the prior distribution and the assumptions about extrapolation go together, as in both
cases we need some sense of how likely it is to see large correlations between the responses to a
subjective stress survey and a biomeasurement such as amygdalar activity. It could well be that
there is a prior expectation of positive correlation between these two variables in the general
population, but that the current data do not provide much information beyond our prior for this
general question.
4 Round-Table Discussion
As described above, the two data sets have each been analyzed by four teams. The different
approaches and conclusions are summarized in Table 5. The discussion was carried out via
email and a transcript can be found online at https://osf.io/f4z7x/. Below we highlight and
summarize the central elements of a discussion that quickly proceeded from the data analysis
techniques in the concrete case to more fundamental philosophical issues. Given the relative
agreement among the conclusions reached by different methodological angles, our discussion
started out with the following deliberately provocative statement:
In statistics, it doesn’t matter what approach is used. As long as you do conduct your anal-
ysis with care, you will invariably arrive at the same qualitative conclusion.7
7The statement is based on Jeffreys’ claims “[a]s a matter of fact I have applied my significance tests to
numerous applications that have also been worked out by Fisher’s, and have not yet found a disagreement in the
actual decisions reached” (Jeffreys, 1939, p. 365) and “it would only be once in a blue moon that we [Fisher and
Jeffreys] would disagree about the inference to be drawn in any particular case, and that in the exceptional cases
we would both be a bit doubtful” (Bennett, 1990, p. 162).
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In agreement with this claim, Hennig stated that “we all seem to have a healthy skepticism
about the models that we are using. This probably contributes strongly to the fact that all
our final interpretations by and large agree. Ultimately our conclusions all state that ‘the data
are inconclusive’. I think the important point here is that we all treat our models as tools for
thinking that can only do so much, and of which the limitations need to be explored, rather than
‘believing in’ our relying on any specific model” (Email 29). On the other hand, Hennig wonders
“whether differences between us would’ve been more pronounced with data that wouldn’t have
allowed us to sit on the fence that easily” (Email 29) and Lakens wonders “about what would
have happened if the data were clearer” (Email 32). In addition, Morey points out that “none
of us had anything invested in these questions, whereas almost always analyses are published
by people who are most invested” (Email 33). Wagenmakers responds that “we [referring to
the group that organized this study] wanted to use simple problems that would not pose im-
mediate problems of either one of the paradigms...[and] we tried to avoid data sets that met
Berkson’s ‘inter-ocular traumatic test’ (when the data are so clear that the conclusion hits you
right between the eyes) where we would immediately agree” (Email 31). In addition, the focus
was on the analyses and discussion as free as possible from other consideration (e.g., personal
investment in the questions).
However, differences between the analyses were emphasized as well. First, Morey argued
that the differences (e.g., research planning, execution, analysis, etc.) between the Bayesian
and frequentist approach are critically important and not easily inter-translatable (Email 2).
This gave rise to an extended discussion about the frequentist procedures’ dependence of the
sampling protocol, which Bayesian procedures lack. While Bayesians such as Wagenmakers
see this as a critical objection against the coherent use of frequentist procedures (e.g., in cases
where the sampling protocol is uncertain), Hennig contends that one can still interpret the p-
value as indicating the compatibility of the data with the null model, assuming a hypothetical
sampling plan (see Email 5-11, 16-18, 23, and 24). Second, Lakens speculated that, in the cases
where the approaches differ, there “might be more variation within specific approaches, than
between” (Email 1). Third, Hennig pointed out that differences in prior specifications could lead
to discrepancies between Bayesians (Email 4) and Homer pointed out that differences in alpha
decision boundaries could lead to discrepancies between frequentists’ conclusions (Email 11).
Finally, Gelman disagreed with most if what had been said in the discussion thus far. Specifically,
he said: “I don’t think ‘alpha’ makes any sense, I don’t think 95% intervals are generally a good
idea, I don’t think it’s necessarily true that points in 95% interval are compatible with the data,
etc etc.” (Email 15).
A concrete issue concerned the equivalence test used by Lakens and Hennig for the first data
set. Wagenmakers objects that it does not add relevant information to the presentation of a
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confidence interval (Email 12). Lakens responds that it allows to reject the hypothesis of a >10%
difference in proportions at almost any alpha level, thereby avoiding reliance on default alpha
levels, which are often used in a mindless way and without attention to the particular case (Email
13).
A more foundational point of contention with the two data sets and their analysis was about
the question of how to formulate Bayesian priors. For these concrete cases, Hennig contends that
the subject-matter information cannot be smoothly translated into prior specifications (Email
27), which is the reason why Morey and Homer choose a frequenstist approach, while Gelman
considers it “hard for me to imagine how to answer the questions without thinking about subject-
matter information” (Email 26).
Lakens raised the question of how much the approaches in this paper are representative of
what researchers do in general (Email 43 and 44). Wagenmakers’ discussion of p-values echoes
this point. While Lakens describes p-values as a guide to “deciding to act in a certain way with
an acceptable risk of error” and contends many scientists conform to this rationale (Email 32),
Wagenmakers has a more pessimistic view. In his experience, the role of p-values is less epistemic
than social: they are used to convince referees and editors and to suggest that the hypothesis
in question is true (Email 37). Also Hennig disagrees with Lakens, but from a frequentist point
of view: they should not guide binary accept/reject-decisions, they just indicate the degree to
which the observed data is compatible with the model specified by the null hypothesis (Email
34).
The question of how data analysis relates to learning, inference and decision-making was
also discussed regarding the merits (and problems) of Bayesian statistics. Hennig contends that
there can be “some substantial gain from them [priors] only if the prior encodes some relevant
information that can help the analysis. However, here we don’t have such information” and
the Bayesian “approach added unnecessary complexity” (Email 23). Wagenmakers reply is that
“prior is not there to help or hurt an analysis: it is there because without it, the models do
not make predictions; and without making predictions, the hypotheses or parameters cannot be
evaluated” and that “the approach is more complex, but this is because it includes some essential
ingredients that the classical analysis omits” (Email 24). In fact, he insinuates that frequentists
learn from data through “Bayes by stealth”: the observed p-values, confidence intervals and other
quantities are used to update the plausibility of the models in an “inexact and intuitive” way.
“Without invoking Bayes’ rule (by stealth) you can’t learn much from a classical analysis, at least
not in any formal sense.” (ibid.) According to Hennig there is more to learning than “updating
epistemic probabilities of certain parameter values being true. For example I find it informative
to learn that ‘Model X is compatible with the data’ ” (Email 25). However, Wagenmakers
considers Hennig’s example of learning as a synonymous to observing. Though he agrees that
“it is informative to know when a specific model is or is not compatible with data; to learn
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anything, however, by its very definition requires some form of knowledge updating” (Email 30).
This discussion evolved, finally, into a general discussion about the philosophical principles and
ideas underlying schools of statistical inference. Ironically, both Lakens (decision-theoretically
oriented frequentism) and Gelman (falsificationist Bayesianism) claim the philosophers of science
Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos, known for their ideas of accumulating scientific progress through
successive falsification attempts, as one of their primary inspirations, although they spell out
their ideas in a different way (Emails 42 and 45).
Hennig and Lakens also devoted some attention to improving statistical practice and either
directly or indirectly questioned the relevance of foundational debates. Concerning the above
issue with using p-values for binary decision-making, Hennig suspects that “if Bayesian method-
ology would be in more widespread use, we’d see the same issue there ... and then ‘reject’ or
‘accept’ based on whether a posterior probability is larger than some mechanical cutoff” (Email
34) and “that much of the controversy about these approaches concerns naive ‘mechanical’ ap-
plications in which formal assumptions are taken for granted to be fulfilled in reality” (Email
29). In addition, Lakens points out that “whether you use one approach to statistics or another
doesn’t matter anything in practice. If my entire department would use a different approach to
statistical inferences (now everyone uses frequentist hypothesis testing) it would have basically
zero impact on their work. However, if they would learn how to better use statistics, and apply
it in a more thoughtful manner, a lot would be gained” (Email 32). Homer provides an apt
conclusion to this topic by stating “I think a lot of problems with research happen long before
statistics get involved. E.g. Issues with measurement; samples and/or methods that can’t answer
the research question; untrained or poor observers” (Email 35).
Finally, an interesting distinction was made between a prescriptive use of statistics and a
more pragmatic use of statistics. As an illustration of the latter, Hennig has a more pragmatic
perspective on statistics, because a strong prescriptive view (i.e., fulfillment of modeling assump-
tions as a strict requirement for statistical inference) would often mean that we cant do anything
in practice (Email 2). To clarify this point, he adds: “Model assumptions are never literally ful-
filled so the question cannot be whether they are..., but rather whether there is information or
features of the data that will mislead the methods that we want to apply” (Email 23). The
former is illustrated by Homer: “I think that assumptions are critically important in statistical
analysis. Statistical assumptions are the axioms which allow a flow of mathematical logic to
lead to a statistical inference. There is some wiggle room when it comes to things like ‘how
robust is this test, which assumes normality, to skew?’ but you are on far safer ground when all
the assumptions are/appear to be met. I personally think that not even checking the plausibil-
ity of assumptions is inexcusable sloppiness (not that I feel anyone here suggested otherwise)”
(Email 11). From what has been said in the discussion, there is general consensus that not all
assumptions need to be met and not all rules need to be strictly followed. However, there is
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great disagreement about which assumptions are important; which rules should be followed and
how strictly; and what can be interpreted from the results when (it is uncertain if) these rules
and assumptions are violated. The interesting subtleties of this topic and the discussants’ views
on use of statistics can be read in the online supplement (model assumptions: Emails 4, 11, 23,
and 24; alpha-levels, p-values, Bayes factors, and decision procedures: Emails 2, 9, 11, 14, 15,
24, and 31-40; sampling plan, optional stopping, and conditioning on the data: Emails 2, 5-11,
16-18, 23, and 24).
In summary, dissimilar methods were used that resulted in similar conclusions and varying
views were discussed on how statistical methods are used and should be used. At times it was
a heated debate with interesting arguments from both (or more) sides. As one might expect,
there was disagreement about particularities of procedures and consensus on the expectation
that scientific practice would be improved by better general education on the use of statistics.
5 Closing Remarks
Four teams each analyzed two published data sets. Despite substantial variation in the statistical
approaches employed, all teams agreed that it would be premature to draw strong conclusions
from either of the data sets. Adding to this cautious attitude are concerns about the nature
of the data. For instance, the first data set was observational, and the second data set may
require a correction for multiplicity. In addition, for each scenario, the research teams indicated
that more background information was desired; for instance, “when is the difference in birth
defects considered too small to matter?”; “what are the effects for similar drugs?”; “is the
correlation selective to the amygdala?”; and “what is the prior distribution for the correlation?”.
Unfortunately, in the routine use of statistical procedures such information is provided only
rarely.
It also became evident that the analysis teams not only needed to make assumptions about
the nature of the data and any relevant background knowledge, but they also needed to interpret
the research question. For the first data set, for instance, the question was formulated as “Is
cetirizine exposure during pregnancy associated with a higher incidence of birth defects?”. What
the original researchers wanted to know, however, is whether or not cetirizine is safe – this
more general question opens up the possibility of applying alternative approaches, such as the
equivalence test, or even a statistical decision analysis: should pregnant women be advised not to
take cetirizine? We purposefully tried to steer clear from decision analyses because the context-
dependent specification of utilities adds another layer of complexity and requires even more
background knowledge than was already demanded for the present approaches. More generally,
the formulation of our research questions was susceptible to multiple interpretation: as tests
against a point null, as tests of direction, or as tests of effect size. The goals of a statistical
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analysis can be many, and it is important to define them unambiguously – again, the routine
use of statistical procedures almost never conveys this information.
Despite the (unfortunately near-universal) ambiguity about the nature of the data, the back-
ground knowledge, and the research question, each analysis team added valuable insights and
ideas. This reinforces the idea that a careful statistical analysis, even for the simplest of scenar-
ios, requires more than a mechanical application of a set of rules; a careful analysis is a process
that involves both skepticism and creativity. Perhaps popular opinion is correct, and statistics
is difficult. On the other hand, despite employing widely different approaches, all teams never-
theless arrived at a similar conclusion. This tentatively supports the Fisher-Jeffreys conjecture
that, regardless of the statistical framework in which they operate, careful analysts will often
come to similar conclusions.
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